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This	briefing	examines	the	 implications	of	Brexit	for	the	
prevention	 and	 management	 of	 gas	 supply	 crises.	 It	
assesses	whether	Brexit	 increases	the	risk	of	gas	supply	
crises	 in	 the	 short-term	 and	 what	 the	 longer-term	
challenges	are	in	this	policy	area	once	the	UK	leaves	the	
European	Union	(EU).	
	
This	 briefing	 is	 part	 of	 an	 ongoing	 research	 project	 on	
the	impact	of	Brexit	on	crisis	management	in	the	UK.	It	is	
based	on	analysis	by	the	author	and	information	drawn	
from	 interviews	 conducted	 with	 various	 stakeholders	
that	 have	 expertise	 and/or	 direct	 input	 into	 the	
management	 of	 gas	 supply	 disruptions	 in	 the	 UK	 and	
North	Western	Europe.	
	
Stakeholder	interviews	include	representatives	from	the	
Energy	 Community,	 Eurogas,	 the	 European	 Federation	
of	 Energy	 Traders,	 European	 Network	 of	 Transmission	
System	 Operators	 for	 Gas	 (ENTSO-G),	 Interconnector	
UK,	 Ofgem,	 Oil	 and	 Gas	 UK,	 and	 the	 UK	 Government.	
Officials	from	the	Commission	for	Regulation	of	Utilities	
(Ireland),	 Department	 for	 the	 Economy	 (Northern	
Ireland)	 Department	 for	 Exiting	 the	 EU	 (UK),	 European	
Commission,	 and	 National	 Grid	 declined	 to	 be	
interviewed	for	this	research.		
	
The	role	of	gas	in	the	UK		
Gas	 plays	 a	 particularly	 important	 role	 within	 the	 UK’s	
energy	 supply.	 It	 is	 the	 second	most	 significant	 fuel	 in	
the	UK’s	overall	energy	mix	(see	figure	1)	and	the	single	
largest	 source	 of	 fuel	 in	 the	 electricity	 generation	 mix	
(see	 figure	 2).	 Gas	 is	 also	 the	 dominant	 fuel	 for	 heat	
generation,	accounting	for	85%	in	2017.	
	
The	UK	is	the	second	largest	gas	market	in	the	EU	and	a	
net	 importer	 of	 gas.	 While	 the	 UK	 is	 also	 the	 third	
largest	producer	of	gas	 in	Europe,	with	53%	of	supplies	
produced	domestically	in	2017,	it	needs	to	import	gas	to	
meet	demand.	Most	of	these	supplies	come	by	pipeline	
from	Norway	 and	 liquefied	 natural	 gas	 (LNG)	 imported	
mainly	from	Qatar.	The	UK	also	imports	and	exports	gas	
to	 continental	 Europe,	 and	 is	 an	 exporter	 of	 gas	 to	
Ireland	(see	figure	3).	
	
Future	levels	of	gas	demand	in	the	UK	are	uncertain.	The	
UK’s	 transmission	 system	 operator,	 National	 Grid,	 has	
recently	published	a	report	in	which	it	identifies	a	range	
of	 scenarios	 up	 to	 2050	 where	 gas	 consumption	
Key	points	
§ The	UK	has	a	 robust	 set	 of	 arrangements	 for	
preventing	 gas	 supply	 disruptions	 which	 are	
linked	 to,	 but	 independent	 of,	 EU-level	
arrangements	
§ Leaving	 the	 EU	 should	 not	 substantially	
increase	 the	 risk	 of	 gas	 supply	 disruptions,	
even	under	a	no	deal	Brexit	
§ Nonetheless,	 the	 UK	 faces	 several	 longer-
term	 challenges	 to	 its	 energy	 security.	
Addressing	 these	 will	 become	 increasingly	
difficult	 once	 the	 UK	 is	 no	 longer	 part	 of	
decision-making	processes	within	the	EU	
§ Once	 the	 UK	 leaves	 the	 EU,	 it	 will	 need	 to	
invest	 considerable	 time	and	 resources	 in	 its	
attempts	to	influence	the	future	development	
of	the	EU	internal	energy	market.		
Figure	2:	UK	Electricity	Generation	2017	
	Source:	UK	Digest	of	Energy	Statistics	2018,	Table	5.1	
Figure	1:	UK	Final	Energy	Consumption	2017	
	Source:	UK	Digest	of	Energy	Statistics	2018,	Table	1.1	
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increases	 (through	 the	 decarbonisation	 of	 gas)	 or	
decreases	 (through	 increased	 electrification). i 	An	
evaluation	of	these	scenarios	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	
paper.	 What	 is	 clear,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	 UK	 will	 still	
require	 large	 quantities	 of	 gas	 over	 at	 least	 the	 next	
decade	under	any	of	the	scenarios.		
	
Gas	supply	deficits	and	emergencies	
Emergency	 or	 crisis	 situations	 in	 which	 gas	 supplies	 to	
consumers	 are	 at	 risk	 of	 disruption	 are	 most	 likely	 to	
occur	when	 there	 is	 a	 ‘gas	 supply	deficit’.	 This	 is	when	
there	 are	 insufficient	 supplies	 available	 to	 meet	
demand,	 and	 can	 be	 caused	 by	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	
difficulties	on	both	the	supply	and	demand	side.	
	
Gas	 supplies	 can,	 for	 instance,	be	 curtailed	 if	 there	are	
technical	problems	or	damage	to	key	infrastructure	such	
as	 import	 pipelines,	 production	 facilities,	 or	 the	 gas	
transmission	system	within	a	 territory.	They	can	also	 in	
some	cases	be	 curtailed	due	 to	 contractual	disputes	or	
politically-motivated	 disruptions.	 Gas	 demand	 could	
increase	 due	 to	 seasonal	 weather	 conditions	 or	
unexpected	 spikes	 in	 demand	 due	 to	 exceptional	
weather	 conditions.	 There	 is	 higher	 demand	 for	 gas	 in	
winter	than	summer	due	to	colder	temperatures,	while	
unseasonably	 low	 temperatures	 can	 result	 in	
unexpected	 and	 rapid	 increases	 in	 demand.	 Weather	
conditions	can	also	affect	 the	demand	 for	gas	as	a	 fuel	
for	 electricity	 generation,	 particularly	 in	 systems	 with	
high	levels	of	renewable	electricity	generation	capacity.	
Gas	supply	deficits	will	not	result	in	a	supply	emergency	
in	 every	 situation.	 This	 depends	 on	whether	 an	 energy	
system	can	adapt	to	and	manage	this	deficit	effectively,	
which	 is	 based	 on	 the	 interplay	 between	 three	 main	
factors:		
§ Supply/demand-side	responses	
During	 a	 gas	 supply	 deficit,	 various	 technical	 and	
operational	responses	may	be	available,	depending	
on	 current	 energy	 infrastructure	 and	 market	
conditions.	On	 the	 supply	 side,	 shortfalls	 could	be	
addressed	through	increased	domestic	production,	
imports	of	alternative	sources	of	supply	(or	through	
alternative	 routes)	 or	 greater	 utilisation	 of	 gas	
storage,	 provided	 the	 infrastructure	 and	 spare	
capacity	 exists	 for	 these	 different	 options.	 On	 the	
demand	 side,	 reductions	 to	 certain	 types	 of	
consumer	 (e.g.	 large	 industrial	 consumers	 or	 gas-
fired	power	plants)	could	free	up	supplies	that	can	
flow	 to	 consumers	who	do	not	have	 the	 ability	 to	
switch	to	other	fuels.	
§ Market	responsiveness	
The	 type	of	market	plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	
system’s	ability	to	utilise	these	measures	in	a	timely	
and	 effective	 manner,	 as	 well	 as	 whether	 market	
participants	 can	 respond	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
government	 intervention.	Markets	 that	 are	 driven	
by	 supply	 and	 demand	 changes	 (as	 reflected	 in	
price	 changes)	may	 be	more	 capable	 of	 attracting	
supplies	and	 reducing	demand	 in	a	 timely	manner	
	
Figure	3:	Net	imports	of	gas	to	the	UK	by	supplier	
		
Source:	UK	Digest	of	Energy	Statistics	2018,	Table	4.5	
Negative	volumes	mean	that	the	UK	was	a	net	exporter	
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than	more	restricted	markets.	This	may	reduce	the	
need	for	direct	government	 intervention,	although	
potentially	at	the	cost	of	price	volatility.	
§ Crisis	governance	
The	 robustness	 of	 emergency	 prevention	 and	
management	 procedures	 matters	 for	 ensuring	 an	
effective	 response	 to	a	 crisis.	 This	usually	 includes	
clear	 definitions	 of	 roles	 and	 responsibilities,	 and	
mechanisms	 for	 the	 coordination	 of	 public	 and	
private	actors,	and	for	the	exchange	of	information	
for	managing	a	crisis.	
	
How	does	the	UK	manage	gas	supply	deficits	
and	prevent	supply	disruptions?	
The	 UK’s	 approach	 to	 the	 management	 of	 gas	 supply	
deficits	is	grounded	in	its	highly-liberalised	gas	market.	It	
has	one	of	the	most	developed	and	responsive	national	
gas	markets	in	Europe,	and	has	been	at	the	forefront	of	
the	efforts	to	both	liberalise	and	integrate	electricity	and	
gas	markets	within	 the	 EU.	 Through	 its	membership	 of	
the	 EU,	 the	 UK	 is	 part	 of	 the	 internal	 gas	 market	 and	
forms	part	of	the	most	liquid	and	developed	part	of	that	
market	 –	 the	North-West	 region	 –	 along	with	 Belgium,	
France,	 Germany,	 Ireland,	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	
Luxembourg.	
	
Based	 on	 this	 market-led	 approach,	 the	 balance	
between	 supply	 and	 demand	 is	 addressed	 through	 the	
market	 under	 normal	 circumstances.	 If	 there	 are,	 for	
instance,	 technical	problems	with	supply	 infrastructure,	
or	increases	in	demand,	then	this	should	be	reflected	in	
the	price	paid	for	gas	in	the	UK	based	on	this	approach.	
To	 the	 extent	 that	 these	 price	 signals	 function,	 this	
allows	the	UK	market	to	cope	with	unexpected	shifts	 in	
supply	 and	 demand,	 without	 requiring	 direct	
government	intervention.		
	
There	 may,	 however,	 be	 circumstances	 when	 the	
market	 is	 not	 able	 to	 respond	without	 some	degree	of	
government	 coordination	 or	 intervention.	 The	 UK	 has	
plans	in	place	for	different	levels	of	response	depending	
on	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 situation.ii	Across	 the	 various	
stages,	 responsibility	 for	 the	 technical	 and	 operational	
aspects	 of	 crisis	 management	 lies	 predominantly	 with	
gas	and	electricity	companies,	while	the	Department	for	
Business,	 Energy	 and	 Industrial	 Strategy	 (BEIS)	 is	
responsible	 for	 assessing	 the	 situation,	 coordinating	
industry	 actions	 and,	 if	 necessary,	 invoking	 the	 use	 of	
emergency	 powers	 by	 central	 government	 through	
escalation	of	the	crisis	to	the	National	Security	Council.	
Emergency	Responses	and	Crisis	Levels	
BEIS	may	decide,	either	pre-emptively	or	in	response	to	
a	 sudden	 shock,	 to	 establish	 an	 Emergency	 Response	
Team	 comprised	 of	 different	 actors	 in	 the	 UK	 energy	
sector,	 typically	 includes	Ofgem	 (the	 energy	 regulator),	
National	 Grid	 (the	 transmission	 system	 operator)	 and	
others	 as	 required.	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	 team	 is	 to	
monitor	 the	 situation	 and	 decide	 on	 the	 level	 of	
response	required.	
	
In	 the	 ‘early	 warning’	 and	 ‘alert’	 stages,	 a	 gas	 deficit	
warning	 may	 be	 issued,	 indicating	 that	 there	 is	
significant	 potential	 for	 an	 emergency	 to	 develop.	 The	
rationale	 behind	 this	 is	 to	 send	 a	 clear	 signal	 to	 the	
market	 to	 attract	 additional	 supplies	 to	 the	UK	market	
based	 on	 higher	 prices,	 and	 to	 enable	 the	 National	
Grid’s	 demand-side	 response	mechanisms	under	which	
large	 consumers	 (mainly	 industry	 and	 electricity	
generators)	will	voluntarily	reduce	their	demand	for	gas	
supplies.	It	is	also	possible	at	this	stage	to	make	appeals	
to	domestic	 and	 smaller	 industrial/commercial	users	 to	
reduce	their	gas	consumption	if	necessary.	
	
During	 these	 first	 two	 stages,	 the	 market	 is	 given	 the	
opportunity	 to	 respond	 without	 direct	 Government	
intervention	in	the	market.	 If	this	 is	 insufficient	then	an	
‘emergency’	 can	 be	 declared,	 at	 which	 point	 the	
Government	may	compel	the	various	participants	in	the	
gas	market	 to	source	additional	supplies,	 release	gas	 in	
storage,	 directly	 allocate	 supplies	 and	 isolate	 parts	 of	
the	 system	 to	maintain	 sufficient	 pressure	 to	maintain	
supplies	to	consumers.	
	
EU	Regulation	on	the	Security	of	Gas	Supplies	
Since	 2010,	 the	 UK’s	 crisis	 preparations	 have	 been	
aligned	 with	 EU	 legislation	 on	 the	 security	 of	 gas	
supplies.iii	Under	the	current	regulation	(2017/1938)	EU	
member	states	are	required	to	conduct	risk	assessments	
based	 on	 harmonised	 gas	 supply	 and	 infrastructure	
standards	(see	figure	4),	and	set	out	preventative	action	
and	emergency	plans	to	mitigate	these	risks	and	specify	
how	 disruptions	 will	 be	 managed.	 The	 regulation	 also	
specifies	arrangements	under	which	crisis	 levels	can	be	
declared	at	a	 regional	or	EU	 level,	and	puts	 restrictions	
on	when	non-market	measures	can	be	used	to	address	a	
crisis.	
	
Unlike	 some	 other	 areas	 of	 crisis	 management,	 where	
the	UK	and	EU	operate	a	highly-coordinated	prevention	
and	 management	 system,	 regulation	 2017/1938	 has	 a	
minimal	 impact	 on	 how	 the	 UK	 handles	 gas	 supply	
deficits.	 Certainly,	 the	 UK	 and	 EU	 crisis	 levels	 and	
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security	standards	are	aligned,	and	the	regulation	places	
some	formal	requirements	on	the	UK	for	reporting	plans	
to	 the	 European	 Commission.	 The	 development	 of	 the	
regulation	has,	however,	been	heavily	influenced	by	the	
UK’s	 own	 emergency	 planning	 arrangements	 and	
therefore	hasn’t	 resulted	 in	major	changes	 to	what	 the	
UK	 already	 did	 before	 the	 legislation	 came	 into	 force.	
The	regulations	predecessor,	994/2010,	was	negotiated	
in	the	 immediate	aftermath	of	the	2009	Russia-Ukraine	
gas	disruption	and	was	explicitly	developed	to	provide	a	
legal	 basis	 for	 assisting	 and	 supporting	 central	 and	
eastern	 EU	 member	 states	 which	 face	 greater	 risks	 to	
their	security	of	supply	than	western	EU	member	states.		
	
Solidarity	and	Information	Exchange	
There	are,	however,	two	aspects	of	the	legislation	which	
do	 matter	 to	 the	 UK.	 First,	 the	 regulation	 includes	 a	
‘solidarity	 clause’	 (article	 13)	 which	 requires	 member	
states	 to	 provide	 additional	 gas	 supplies	 to	 other	
member	states	that	are	directly	connected	to	it,	if	there	
is	an	emergency	and	the	article	is	invoked.	The	article	is	
designed	 to	be	used	as	 a	 last	 resort	 to	ensure	 that	 so-
called	 ‘protected	 customers’	 (typically	 households	 and	
essential	 public	 services)	 do	 not	 have	 their	 supplies	
disrupted.	 For	 the	 UK,	 this	 means	 that	 it	 may	 have	 to	
interrupt	 some	 of	 its	 own	 non-protected	 customers	 to	
assist	 Ireland,	 Belgium	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 in	
exceptional	 circumstances.	 However,	 it	 also	 allows	 the	
UK	 to	 benefit	 from	 those	 arrangements	 if	 had	
insufficient	 supplies	 to	 keep	 its	 own	 protected	
customers	connected.	
Second,	 the	 regulation	 helps	 the	 UK	 to	 have	 greater	
oversight	over	the	supply	situation	in	continental	Europe	
through	 the	 Gas	 Coordination	 Group	 (GCG).	 This	 is	 an	
EU	 body	 that	 meets	 on	 a	 semi-regular	 basis	 or	 during	
emergency	situations.	It	is	composed	of	representatives	
of	 the	 EU	 Member	 States,	 the	 European	 Commission,	
the	 Agency	 for	 the	 Cooperation	 of	 Energy	 Regulators	
(ACER),	 the	 coordination	 body	 for	 gas	 transmission	
system	 operators	 (ENTSOG)	 and	 other	 energy	 industry	
representatives.	 Its	 aim	 is	 to	 facilitate	 information	
exchange	 across	 the	 EU,	 particularly	 during	 emergency	
situations,	 and	 to	 assist	 the	 member	 states	 in	
coordinating	 their	 emergency	 responses	 if	 there	 is	 a	
regional	and	European	gas	emergency.	
	
Will	 the	 UK	 be	 more	 at	 risk	 of	 gas	 supply	
disruptions	once	it	leaves	the	EU?	
To	 evaluate	 the	 impact	 that	 Brexit	 has	 on	 the	 risk	 of	
supply	 disruptions	 there	 are	 two	 main	 considerations,	
which	are	interlinked.	First,	how	secure	are	the	UK’s	gas	
supplies?	Second,	will	 leaving	the	EU	mean	that	the	UK	
is	less	able	to	manage	a	crisis,	should	one	arise?	
	
The	answer	 to	 the	 latter	question	 is	 clearly	affected	by	
the	terms	under	which	the	UK	leaves	the	EU.	At	the	time	
of	writing,	 it	 is	not	yet	clear	 if	 the	UK	will	 leave	with	or	
without	a	withdrawal	agreement.	This	may	be	clearer	by	
the	 time	 anyone	 reads	 this.	 Therefore,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	
simplicity,	 this	 evaluation	 is	 based	 on	 the	 UK	 leaving	
with	 ‘no	deal’,	working	on	the	principle	 that	 this	would	
Figure	4:	EU	supply	and	infrastructure	standards	and	how	they	are	applied	in	the	UK	
	
Infrastructure	standard	
(Article	5)	
Member	states	are	required	to	ensure	that	they	can	
meet	 their	 total	 gas	 demand	 even	 if	 their	 largest	
capacity	 infrastructure	was	 unavailable	 during	 a	 day	
of	 exceptionally	 high	 gas	 demand	 (with	 a	 statistical	
probability	of	once	in	20	years).	This	is	also	known	as	
the	N-1	standard.		
The	 UK	 meets	 this	 standard	 based	 on	 the	 Felindre	
pipeline	 which	 connects	 two	 LNG	 terminals	 (South	
Hook	and	Dragon)	to	the	national	grid.	
This	 standard	 can	 also	 be	 met	 on	 a	 regional	 basis.	
Ireland	 currently	 meets	 this	 based	 on	 the	 UK’s	 N-1	
calculation.	
	
Gas	supply	standard	
(Article	6)	
Member	 states	 are	 required	 to	 ensure	 that	 gas	
supplies	to	‘protected	customers’	continue	in	each	of	
three	cases:	
a) There	 are	 extremely	 cold	 temperatures	 during	 a	
‘1-in-20	years’	winter,	measured	over	7	days	
b) There	 is	 exceptionally	 high	 demand	 for	 30	 days,	
during	a	‘1-in-20	years’	winter	
c) The	 single	 largest	 gas	 infrastructure	 is	 disrupted	
for	30	days	under	average	winter	conditions		
The	UK	defines	 its	protected	customers	as	household	
consumers,	SMEs,	and	essential	social	services	where	
gas	disruptions	could	endanger	health.	
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be	 the	most	 potentially	 disruptive	 scenario.	 This	 is	 the	
default	 outcome	 of	 the	 negotiations	 under	 Article	 50,	
and	would	arise	if	the	UK	and	EU	fail	to	agree	and	ratify	
the	terms	of	the	UK’s	withdrawal.	This	would	mean	that	
the	UK	 leaves	 the	 EU	 at	 11pm	on	 29th	March	 2019,	 at	
which	point	the	UK	would	no	longer	be	a	member	of	the	
internal	gas	market	or	bound	by	regulation	2017/1938.	
	
There	is	a	clear	consensus	among	those	interviewed	for	
this	 research	 that	 the	 UK	 should	 not	 be	 at	 risk	 of	 gas	
supply	 disruptions	 because	 of	 its	 decision	 to	 leave	 the	
EU.	This	does	not	mean	that	there	are	no	risks.	Absolute	
security	 is	 a	 practical	 impossibility,	 and	 it	 is	 always	
possible	 to	 imagine	 extreme	 scenarios	 in	 which	 there	
are	 simultaneously	 major	 problems	 on	 the	 supply	 and	
demand	 side.	 Likewise,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 emergency	
situations	 in	 other	 policy	 areas	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	
gas	sector	or	the	UK	Government	struggles	to	deal	with	
multiple	 crisis	 situations	 at	 once	 due	 to	 ‘no	 deal’.	
However,	 the	 key	 considerations	 when	 evaluating	 the	
potential	 for	 supply	disruptions	are	 the	current	 level	of	
security	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 direct	 impacts	 that	 leaving	
the	 EU	 without	 a	 deal	 would	 have.	 Focusing	 on	 these	
aspects,	there	are	reasons	to	be	relatively	optimistic.	
	
The	 UK	 has	 diverse	 infrastructure	 and	 a	 responsive	
market	that	allows	it	to	adapt	to	gas	supply	deficits	
There	was	 a	 clear	 consensus	 among	 those	 interviewed	
that	 the	UK	has	 a	high	 level	 of	 gas	 supply	 security	 and	
should	 be	 able	 to	 respond	 to	 gas	 supply	 deficits	 under	
most	circumstances,	even	during	and	after	Brexit.	
	
	
The	 UK	 has	 diverse	 infrastructure	 for	 importing	 gas	
supplies	 from	 Norway,	 continental	 EU	 and	 LNG	 (see	
figure	 5).	 This	means	 that	 the	UK	 has	multiple	 options	
for	 coping	 with	 a	 gas	 supply	 deficit,	 regardless	 of	
whether	 it	 is	 a	 member	 of	 the	 EU	 or	 not.	 Several	
interviewees	 with	 knowledge	 of	 North	 Sea	 gas	
production	 noted	 that	 even	 during	 periods	 of	 high	
demand,	there	is	usually	spare	production	capacity	from	
both	 the	 UK	 and	 Norway	 that	 can	 be	 temporarily	
increased	 to	 address	 sudden	 shocks.	 Similarly,	 the	 UK	
also	 has	 a	 very	 high	 level	 of	 LNG	 import	 capacity	 in	
comparison	to	most	EU	countries.	
	
While	 the	 physical	 capacity	 for	 the	 UK	 to	 increase	
production	 and	 imports	 exists,	much	 depends	 on	 both	
the	 availability	 of	 these	 supplies	 and	 the	 UK’s	
attractiveness	 as	 a	 market.	 Many	 interviewees	 noted	
that	 UK	 prices	 are	 highly	 responsive	 to	 shifts	 in	 supply	
and	demand.	While	this	can	result	in	price	volatility,	this	
does	 mean	 that	 it	 sends	 very	 clear	 price	 signals	 to	
potential	 shippers	 of	 gas	 to	 the	 UK	 (as	 well	 as	 to	 UK	
consumers	who	may	 be	 able	 to	 reduce	 their	 demand).	
This	is	particularly	important	for	attracting	LNG	cargoes,	
which	 are	 usually	 more	 expensive	 that	 pipeline	 gas.	
Because	of	this,	short-term	price	increases	can	make	the	
UK	a	particularly	attractive	destination	for	LNG	supplies,	
although	 the	 downside	 is	 that	 it	 can	 take	 several	 days	
for	shipments	to	arrive	in	the	UK.	
	
The	 UK	 has	 a	 strong	 track	 record	 of	 dealing	 with	 gas	
supply	deficits	without	intervening	in	the	market	
Another	 key	 factor	 mentioned	 by	 interviewees	 is	 that	
the	UK	has	never	had	to	declare	a	gas	supply	emergency	
whenever	gas	supply	deficits	have	occurred	in	the	past.	
In	 all	 cases,	 ranging	 from	 a	 major	 fire	 at	 the	 Rough	
storage	 facility	 in	 2006,	 supply	 disruptions	 to	 the	 EU	
from	 Russia	 in	 2006	 and	 2009,	 and	 extremely	 cold	
winters	in	recent	years,	the	UK	government	has	not	had	
to	 resort	 to	 non-market	 measures	 to	 manage	 the	
situation.	
	
One	recent	example	which	 illustrates	this	 is	a	period	of	
extremely	 cold	 weather	 in	 February	 and	 March	 2018,	
known	 as	 the	 ‘Beast	 from	 the	 East’	 when	 demand	
increased	 rapidly.	 This	 was	 compounded	 by	 multiple	
disruptions	 to	 supply	 infrastructure	 within	 the	 UK	 and	
continental	Europe.	In	this	case,	exports	to	Ireland	were	
reduced,	 gas	 demand	 from	 the	 power	 sector	 and	
industry	 were	 reduced	 voluntarily	 (based	 on	 the	 gas	
deficit	warning	 and	 price	 rises),	 and	 supplies	 increased	
from	 continental	 Europe	 and	 Norway.	 Imports	 of	
Figure	5:	UK	import	and	export	infrastructure	
	 Maximum	
Daily	Flow	
(mcm)	
Annual	
capacity	
(bcm)	
Import	Pipelines	 	
Norway	 163	 59.5	
Belgium	(IUK)	 74	 27.0	
Netherlands	(BBL)	 45	 16.4	
Liquefied	Natural	Gas	
South	Hook	 58	 21.2	
Dragon	 21	 7.7	
Isle	of	Grain	 56	 20.4	
Teeside	 11	 4.0	
TOTAL	IMPORT	CAPACITY	 428	 156.2	
Export	Pipelines	
Belgium	(IUK)	 55	 20.1	
Ireland	(IC1/2)	 30	 11.0	
TOTAL	EXPORT	CAPACITY	 85	 31.1	
Source:	UK	Digest	of	Energy	Statistics	2018,	Table	4.4.	
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electricity	 also	 increased	 to	 help	make	 up	 the	 shortfall	
from	reduced	generation	within	the	UK.iv	However	at	no	
point	were	non-market	measures	used.	
		
Several	 interviewees	 highlighted	 this	 case	 as	 a	
particularly	difficult	test	of	UK	crisis	preparedness,	which	
it	 passed	without	 having	 to	 use	 non-market	measures.	
While	 one	 interviewee	 involved	 in	 crisis	 response	
admitted	 that	 they	 had	 a	 rather	 ‘uncomfortable’	 day	
monitoring	 the	 situation	when	 the	Beast	 from	 the	East	
hit	 the	UK,	 the	market	 responded	 and	 the	UK	was	 not	
close	to	having	to	interrupt	supplies	to	consumers.	
	
Gas	flows	from	the	EU	to	the	UK	should	continue,	even	
if	the	UK	leaves	with	‘no	deal’	
Turning	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 Brexit,	 there	 are	 widespread	
concerns	 that	 a	 no	 deal	 scenario	 could	 result	 in	 crisis	
situations	 across	 numerous	 policy	 areas.	 While	 the	
energy	 sector	 is	 not	 immune	 to	 such	 concerns,	
according	 to	 those	 interviewed	 for	 this	 research,	 such	
disruptions	to	EU	flows	are	unlikely,	even	 in	a	 ‘no	deal’	
scenario.	While	the	UK	will	leave	the	internal	gas	market	
and	this	may	result	in	some	friction	in	how	gas	is	traded	
in	 the	 future,	 interviewees	 did	 not	 express	 major	
concerns	 about	 the	 continuation	 of	 gas	 trade	 between	
the	UK	and	EU	for	two	main	reasons.	
	
First,	the	UK	and	EU	will	not	enter	a	legal	vacuum.	Both	
are	 signatories	 of	 the	 Energy	 Charter	 Treaty,	 which	
contains	 provisions	 on	 both	 trade	 and	 transit.	 Aside	
from	 including	 commitments	 to	 open	 markets,	 the	
Treaty	 also	 prohibits	 the	 interruption	 of	 supplies	
transiting	 the	 territory	 of	 any	 of	 its	 signatories.	 This	
means	that	 if	the	UK	imported	gas	which	had	to	transit	
across	the	EU	to	reach	its	destination	then	it	should	not	
be	disrupted	by	the	EU.	The	one	proviso	is	that	this	gas	
would	have	to	 follow	EU	rules	while	 it	 is	 in	transit.	This	
would	mean	that	there	are	no	entry/exit	fees	for	each	of	
the	 EU	member	 states	 that	 the	 gas	 had	 to	 cross.	 This	
would	similarly	apply	in	cases	where	the	UK	is	acting	as	a	
transit	state	for	supplies	to	an	EU	member	state,	which	
would	 become	 the	 case	 with	 supplies	 from	 the	 EU	 or	
Norway	to	Ireland.	
	
Second,	 and	 quite	 aside	 from	 the	 legal	 arrangements,	
there	is	a	clear	political	incentive	to	ensure	gas	can	flow	
from	the	EU	to	the	UK	during	an	emergency	because	of	
the	 knock	 on	 effects	 this	 could	 have	 on	 Ireland,	 as	 a	
continuing	 EU	member	 state.	 This	 is	 because	 Ireland	 is	
entirely	 dependent	 on	 the	 UK’s	 gas	 network	 for	
importing	gas.	While	there	are	plans	to	construct	a	new	
liquefied	 natural	 gas	 (LNG)	 terminal	 at	 Shannon	 to	
reduce	 this	 dependence,	 this	 will	 not	 become	 active	
until	the	early	2020s.	This	is	around	the	same	time	that	
the	Corrib	gas	field,	which	is	the	source	of	almost	all	of	
Ireland’s	domestically	produced	gas,	will	have	declined.	
While	 Ireland	 currently	 produces	 57%	 of	 the	 gas	 it	
consumes,	 by	 the	 early	 2020s	 it	 will	 be	 entirely	
	
	
Construction	of	a	pipeline	between	Cluden	and	Brighouse	in	Scotland,	as	part	of	the	Scotland-Ireland	
interconnector	project	that	has	recently	received	financing	from	the	European	Investment	Bank		
	
Image	by	Alistair	Hamilton,	licensed	under	CC	BY	2.0.	
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dependent	 on	 imported	 sources.	 If	 there	were	 to	 be	 a	
disruption	 to	 supplies	 from	 the	 EU	 to	 the	UK	 then	 this	
could	result	in	a	gas	supply	deficit	and	possibly	a	supply	
emergency	in	Ireland.	
	
This	 is	 clearly	 not	 in	 the	 UK	 or	 EU’s	 interests	 and	 it	
seems	 likely	 that	 all	 efforts	 would	 be	 made	 to	 ensure	
that	 gas	 flows	 continued	 to	 the	 UK	 and	 Ireland	 if	 an	
emergency	were	 to	 arise.	 These	political	 incentives	 are	
underpinned	 by	 changes	 that	 were	 made	 to	 the	
solidarity	clause	during	the	negotiation	of	EU	regulation	
2017/1938.	 This	 legislation,	 which	 was	 negotiated	
during	 the	 Article	 50	 negotiations,	 includes	 a	 key	
provision	that	relates	to	the	UK:	
	
A	 Member	 State	 shall	 also	 provide	 the	 solidarity	
measure	 to	 another	 Member	 State	 to	 which	 it	 is	
connected	 via	 a	 third	 country	 unless	 flows	 are	
restricted	 through	 the	 third	 country.	 Such	 an	
extension	 of	 the	 measure	 shall	 be	 subject	 to	 the	
agreement	 of	 the	 relevant	 Member	 States,	 who	
shall	 involve,	 as	 appropriate,	 the	 third	 country	
through	which	they	are	connected.	
	
Based	on	 this,	 the	Netherlands	and	Belgium,	which	are	
connected	 to	 Ireland	via	 the	UK,	would	be	expected	 to	
reduce	 their	 own	 demand	 so	 they	 can	 provide	 gas	 to	
Ireland.	 This	would	 necessarily	 involve	 discussions	with	
the	UK	 as	 a	 third	 country.	While	 this	 provision	has	 not	
been	 tested,	 it	 provides	 some	 reassurance	 that	 EU	 gas	
supplies	to	Ireland	via	UK	would	not	be	disrupted.	
	
Unanticipated	 problems	 should	 be	 mitigated	 by	 the	
seasonality	of	gas	demand	
While	it	 is	very	unlikely	that	there	would	be	disruptions	
to	physical	gas	flows	from	the	EU	to	the	UK	during	a	‘no	
deal’	 Brexit,	 some	 interviewees	 noted	 that	 EU	 supplies	
are	 an	 important	 source	 of	 flexibility	 during	 gas	 supply	
deficits	in	winter.	Although	the	UK	does	not	import	large	
amounts	of	gas	from	the	EU	(see	figure	3	earlier	 in	this	
brief),	 it	does	make	use	of	these	supplies	during	winter	
when	 consumption	 is	 highest	 (see	 figure	 6).	 The	
interconnector	and	BBL	serve	a	dual	function	–	they	are	
used	 for	 gas	 trading	 within	 the	 North-West	 European	
market	 (by	 connecting	 the	 British	 and	Dutch	 gas	 hubs)	
and	 for	 meeting	 seasonal	 demand	 needs.	 Even	 if	
disruptions	to	these	supplies	are	very	unlikely	
	
The	good	news	 is	 that	 the	 timing	of	 the	UK’s	exit	 from	
the	EU	under	a	‘no	deal’	scenario	is	relatively	fortuitous.	
If	 the	 UK	 leaves	 the	 EU	 without	 a	 deal	 on	 29th	 March	
2019,	 then	 it	 will	 coincide	 with	 a	 reduction	 in	 gas	
demand,	 thereby	 reducing	 the	 strain	 on	 the	 UK’s	 gas	
supply	system	during	a	period	of	political	and	economic	
uncertainty.	 While	 this	 doesn’t	 tell	 us	 anything	 about	
the	 UK’s	 longer	 term	 ability	 to	 prevent	 gas	 supply	
emergencies,	it	does	mean	that	‘no	deal’	itself	is	unlikely	
to	be	a	cause	of	supply	problems.	On	the	other	hand,	if	
the	 current	 withdrawal	 agreement	 were	 to	 be	 signed,	
this	would	 include	 a	 transition	 period	 during	which	 EU	
rules	would	continue	to	apply	to	the	UK.	When	this	ends	
on	 31st	 December	 2020	 during	 the	 height	 of	 winter	
demand,	 the	 situation	 could	 look	 different	 if	 supplies	
from	the	EU	were	needed.	
	
Figure	6:	Monthly	gas	consumption	in	the	UK	over	the	past	five	years	
	Source:	Eurostat		
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Future	Challenges		
	
Future	Flexibilities	
While	the	UK	gas	system	is	currently	able	to	handle	gas	
crises,	 at	 least	 based	 on	 the	 analysis	 above,	 there	 are	
some	 question	 marks	 over	 its	 future	 security.	 In	
particular,	there	is	a	concern	that	some	of	the	flexibility	
it	 has	 been	 able	 to	 rely	 on	 may	 reduce	 over	 time	 as	
domestic	production	reduces	further.	
	
In	 2017,	 while	 the	 Brexit	 negotiations	 were	 underway,	
Centrica	 announced	 that	 it	 was	 going	 to	 permanently	
close	Rough,	 the	UK’s	single	 largest	gas	storage	 facility.	
This	has	 reduced	 the	UK’s	 storage	 capacity	 from	6%	of	
annual	 demand	 to	 1.6%	 and	 removes	 one	 of	 the	
flexibilities	within	the	system,	particularly	as	Rough	was	
long-range	 storage	 which	 was	 predominantly	 used	 in	
winter	 when	 demand	 was	 highest	 to	 both	 address	
supply	shortfalls	and	to	prevent	major	price	fluctuations.		
	
Some	interviewees	have	noted	that	this	may	mean	that	
the	UK	becomes	more	reliant	on	the	flexibility	provided	
by	 supplies	 from	 the	EU	 than	 in	previous	years.	Others	
were	 relatively	 relaxed	 about	 the	 closure	 of	 Rough,	
noting	that	 it	was	not	available	as	a	source	of	 flexibility	
during	 the	 Beast	 from	 the	 East	 incident,	 and	 was	 not	
required.	This	 latter	 view	 is	broadly	 in	 line	with	 the	UK	
Government’s	 own	 position.	 In	 its	 analysis	 of	 gas	
security	published	in	October	2017,	the	UK	Government	
argued	 that	 the	 closure	 of	 Rough	 would	 not	 have	 a	
major	 impact	 on	 the	UK’s	 ability	 to	meet	 gas	 demand,	
except	in	the	most	extreme	of	circumstances.		
	
The	 UK	 government	 has	 traditionally	 resisted	 calls	 to	
develop	or	subsidise	strategic	storage	on	the	basis	 that	
this	would	reduce	the	incentives	for	companies	to	invest	
in	 commercial	 storage.	 While	 there	 are	 no	 indications	
that	 this	 position	 will	 change,	 some	 interviewees	
thought	it	likely	that	calls	for	government	investments	in	
storage	 would	 increase	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Brexit.	 Whether	
this	happens	remains	to	be	seen.	
	
It	is	also	worth	noting	that	even	if	Rough	is	not	required	
as	 a	 source	 of	 supplies,	 its	 role	 in	 reducing	 price	
volatility	 should	 not	 be	 underestimated.	 The	
International	 Energy	 Agency	 has	 argued	 that	 if	 Rough	
had	 been	 fully	 operational	 during	 the	 ‘Beast	 from	 the	
East’	then	it	would	have	helped	to	mitigate	some	of	the	
price	volatility	that	was	experienced	during	that	period,	
when	prices	increased	dramatically	to	a	20-year	high.	
	
It	 is	 reasonable	 to	 ask	 whether	 price	 spikes	 of	 this	
magnitude	 are	 an	 acceptable	 means	 of	 ensuring	 the	
security	 of	 supplies,	 particularly	when	 these	 prices	will	
have	a	knock-on	effect	on	the	prices	paid	by	consumers.	
This	 raises	 issues	 about	 the	 trade-offs	 involved	 in	
addressing	 energy	 security	 and	 energy	 poverty	
concerns.	
	
Changing	policy	networks	and	channels	of	influence	
When	 the	 UK	 leaves	 the	 EU,	 it	 will	 leave	 the	 internal	
market	 for	 gas	 and	 electricity.	 Aside	 from	 the	 wider	
economic	 impact	 that	 leaving	 the	 internal	 market	 will	
have	in	the	electricity	and	gas	sectors	(which	are	beyond	
the	scope	of	this	paper),	this	will	also	mean	that	the	UK	
will	lose	much	of	the	influence	it	currently	enjoys	within	
the	EU’s	networks	and	institutional	structures.		
	
Having	 influence	 over	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 internal	 market	
and	 EU	 energy	 policy	 more	 broadly	 will	 still	 matter	 to	
the	UK	post-Brexit.	It	will	remain	physically	connected	to	
the	 EU	 market	 and	 will	 engage	 in	 some	 level	 of	
electricity	 and	 gas	 trade	 with	 it.	 Having	 no	 ability	 to	
shape	the	rules	of	that	market	may	result	in	divergence	
in	 the	 regulatory	 regimes	 of	 the	UK	 and	 EU	over	 time.	
Several	 interviewees	 expressed	 concerns	 that	 if	 this	
were	 to	 happen	 it	would	 likely	 impose	 additional	 costs	
on	the	electricity	and	gas	industry.	
	
While	 it	 has	been	 a	member,	 the	UK’s	 influence	 in	 the	
EU	 gas	 sector	 has	 mainly	 come	 from	 four	 sources:	 its	
historical	 role	 as	 a	 leading	 advocate	 and	 source	 of	
expertise	on	the	liberalisation	of	energy	markets,	the	UK	
Government’s	 power	 within	 the	 European	 Council	 and	
Council	 of	 Ministers	 as	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 member	
states,	 Ofgem’s	 expertise	 and	 institutional	 role	 within	
the	 Agency	 for	 the	 Cooperation	 of	 Energy	 Regulators	
(ACER),	 and	 National	 Grid	 through	 the	 European	
Network	of	Transmission	System	Operators	(ENTSO-G).	
	
Most	 interviewees	 noted	 that	while	 the	UK	 is	 a	 valued	
member	 of	 the	 EU,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 it	 will	 no	 longer	 be	
able	 to	 participate	 in	 key	 institutional	 bodies	 and	 will	
inevitably	 lose	 influence	as	a	result.	 	Aside	from	the	UK	
Government	 no	 longer	 being	 part	 of	 the	 Council	 it	 is	
clear	 that	 Ofgem	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 remain	 a	 full	
member	 of	 ACER.	 They	may	 be	 able	 to	 have	 observer	
status,	 subject	 to	 negotiations,	 and	 could	 therefore	
potentially	 participate	 in	 working	 groups.	 They	 would	
not,	 however,	 be	 represented	 on	 the	 board	 or	 have	
voting	 rights.	 This	 is	 because	ACER	 is	 an	 agency	 of	 the	
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EU	and	under	the	terms	of	withdrawal	(or	in	a	‘no	deal’	
scenario)	 the	 UK	 cannot	 remain	 a	 member.	 It	 is	 less	
clear	 if	 National	 Grid	 will	 similarly	 be	 ejected	 from	
ENTSO-G,	although	if	it	does	remain	it	will	probably	be	in	
an	observer	capacity.	This	substantially	reduces	the	UK’s	
ability	to	exercise	influence.		
	
The	other	body	that	the	UK	will	no	longer	be	a	member	
of	is	the	Gas	Coordination	Group.	As	noted	above,	there	
is	 some	 potential	 for	 the	 UK	 to	 be	 involved	 in	
discussions	with	the	Netherlands,	Belgium	and	Ireland	in	
the	 event	 of	 gas	 supply	 deficits	 in	North	West	 Europe,	
but	it	is	unclear	if	this	would	include	the	right	for	the	UK	
to	participate	in	Gas	Coordination	Group	meetings.	
	
While	 it	 is	 inevitable	 that	 the	 UK’s	 influence	will	 wane	
over	time,	there	are	some	options	for	maintaining	some	
level	of	engagement.	The	UK	has	been	actively	exploring	
these,	but	at	the	time	of	writing	there	is	no	information	
on	how	advanced	or	not	discussions	may	be.	
	
One	option	mentioned	by	several	 interviewees	was	 the	
possibility	 of	 the	 UK	 maintaining	 some	 level	 of	
engagement	by	joining	the	Energy	Community.	This	is	an	
organisation	 that	 was	 designed	 for	 exporting	 EU	
legislation	 on	 the	 internal	 energy	 market	 to	 non-EU	
members	 in	 South	 East	 Europe	 and	 further	 afield.	
Joining	 this	 organisation	 could,	 for	 instance,	 allow	 the	
UK	to	participate	in	the	Gas	Coordination	Group	as	other	
Energy	Community	members	currently	do.	
	
Another	 suggested	 option	 was	 for	 the	 UK	 to	 become	
more	active	in	a	variety	of	non-EU	organisations.	On	the	
regulatory	 side,	 this	 includes	 the	 Council	 of	 European	
Energy	 Regulators	 (CEER),	 which	 is	 the	 so-called	
‘political	 arm’	 of	 ACER’s	 members.	 Others	 suggested	
that	 the	 International	 Energy	Agency	 could	be	 ‘beefed’	
up	 to	 deal	with	 gas	 security	 issues,	 although	what	 this	
would	actually	involve	is	very	unclear.	
	
The	 viability	 of	 these	 different	 options	 is	 beyond	 the	
scope	of	 this	paper.	What	 is	clear,	however,	 is	 that	 the	
UK	will	have	to	be	creative	in	how	it	attempts	to	develop	
new	channels	of	influence	once	it	is	no	longer	a	member	
of	 the	EU.	This	has	resource	 implications	for	the	British	
state	 because,	 as	 one	 interviewee	 noted,	 the	 UK	 will	
need	 to	 work	 much	 harder	 than	 it	 does	 now	 just	 to	
stand	still.	
	
																																								 																				
i	 In	March	2018,	National	Grid	published	 its	 latest	Future	of	
Gas	 report,	 which	 includes	 these	 scenarios.	 This	 can	 be	
accessed	at	 http://futureofgas.uk/news/future-of-gas-how-
gas-can-support-a-low-carbon-future/		
ii	 See	 the	 National	 Emergency	 Plan:	 Downstream	 Gas	 and	
Electricity,	 which	 is	 available	 at:	
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploa
ds/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/577707/National
_Emergency_Plan_for_Downstream_Gas_and_Electricity_2
016.pdf	
iii	 The	UK’s	crisis	preparations	were	also	previously	affected	to	
the	 forerunner	 of	 the	 2010	 Regulation,	 Directive	
2004/67/EC.	 This	 earlier	 legislation	 did	 not,	 however,	 set	
out	any	detailed	requirements	or	guidance	for	EU	member	
states	 to	 follow.	 Instead	 it	merely	 required	member	states	
to	have	gas	security	policies	in	place,	which	the	UK	already	
had.		
iv	 For	 further	details,	 see	 International	Energy	Agency	 (2018)	
Global	Gas	Security	Review	2018	 (Paris:	OECD/IEA),	pp.	31-
34.	
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